

Anonymity

Professor Grimmelmann
Internet Law
Fall 2007
Class 11

Where we are

- Introduction
- Part I: Public Law
 - Jurisdiction
 - Free Speech
 - Intermediaries
 - Privacy
- Part II: Private Law

In today's class

- The importance of anonymity
- Looking behind the mask
 - By private parties
 - By the government
- Compelled prospective monitoring?

Electronic privacy law

Questions you should *always* ask

- Is the intermediary revealing *content* or *non-content* information?
- Is the intermediary revealing information to a *private party* or the *government*?
- Is the intermediary revealing information *voluntarily* or being *compelled* to?
- Is the privacy breach *retrospective* or *prospective*?

Road map

**What kind
of data?**

Content

Non-content

To whom?


Government

Private parties


Today

Thursday

Next Tuesday



Road map (zoomed in)



ECPA (1986)


- Electronic Communications Privacy Act
 - Title I: amends Wiretap Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 *et seq.*)
 - Title II: Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 *et seq.*)
 - Title III: Pen Registers / Trap and Trace (18 U.S.C. §§ 3121 *et seq.*)

My attitude towards these statutes

- Three words: You. Can. Read.
 - The statutes are complex and changing
 - This isn't a crim pro course
 - In practice, you'll look it up
- Goal: learn the basic framework, and where you'd look when you need to figure out the details

Why anonymity matters

Vernor Vinge, *True Names* (1981)



Who is Mr. Slippery?

- Mr. Slippery is a notorious cybercriminal
- Roger Andrew Pollack is a novelist
- What happens if someone makes the connection?
 - They show up with the black helicopters
 - File for later: why does Vinge call the government the “Great Enemy?”
- Is anonymity good or bad?

Anonymity and section 230

- Think back to last week: how would the cases have changed if there were no anonymity online?
- It's not a panacea: *Cubby*, *Drudge*, and *Roommates.com* involve known posters
- But *Zeran* might have been very different, and maybe *Stratton*, too

Anonymity and pseudonymity

- This is a very important distinction!
- Is Zorro anonymous or pseudonymous?
- There are times when we can hold a pseudonym accountable without knowing who's behind it
 - Think of eBay

Anonymity and intermediaries

- It's hard to be anonymous face-to-face
- You generally need an intermediary to establish anonymity
 - E.g. a lawyer or a computer network
- Which means . . .
 - . . . the intermediary becomes capable of revealing your identity

Quick example

- “Ken ZZ07” posts on a web forum at scandalrag.com that I’ve been dumping toxic chemicals in Long Island Sound
- I want to sue
- How do I track him/her/it down?
 - First, get an IP address from scandalrag
 - Then, get subscriber information from the owner of that IP block

Private identification

Road map (zoomed in)

Today

Retrospective

Prospective

Private Government

Voluntary

Compelled

Private Government

Voluntary

Compelled

n/a	n/a

Turning over subscriber data

Private

Government

Voluntary

Involuntary

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- 

Why doesn't ECPA apply here?

- Prohibits disclosing subscriber records . . .
 - . . . but § 2702(c)(5) allows disclosure to “any person other than a governmental agency”
- Thus, if your ISP turns over your information to a private party . . .
 - . . . you're out of luck
 - (unless your contract says otherwise)

Turning over subscriber data

Private

Government

Voluntary

OK

Involuntary

How about compelled disclosure?

- Joe Litigant serves your ISP with a subpoena for your identifying information
 - ECPA doesn't protect you, but can your ISP refuse to turn over the information?
- In the federal system, subpoenas are governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 45
 - States have their own rules
 - In either, court interpretations matter

In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL

- Some preliminaries:
 - A subpoena *what*?
 - Why is this an “in re” case?
 - Who has standing to move to quash?
 - What information would the court have available in ruling on the motion?

In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL

- Balance: right to speak anonymously vs. no right to commit torts anonymously
- Three-part test to learn a party's identity:
 - Based on the pleadings or evidence
 - “Legitimate, good-faith basis to contend” there's a valid cause of action
 - The “subpoenaed identity information is centrally needed to advance that claim”

Doe v. 2TheMart.com

- Unknown parties go on Silicon Investor and write:
 - Truthseeker: “TMRT is a Ponzi scam that Charles Ponzi would be proud of”
 - Cluemaster: “they were dumped by their accountants ... these guys are friggin liars”
 - “Lying, cheating, thieving, stealing, lowlife criminals!!!”

Doe v. 2TheMart.com

- This is a shareholder derivative suit
 - The anonymous posters aren't parties to the case
 - In fact, what's TMRT's theory of why their identities are relevant?
 - Why do you think TMRT wants to know who they are?
- The holding is unsurprising

How do these cases differ?

- The TMRT four-part test to learn a non-party's identity:
 - Sought in good faith
 - Relates to a core claim or defense
 - Directly and materially relevant
 - Unavailable from any other source
- What's different about this test? Why?

Turning over subscriber data

Private

Government

Voluntary

OK

Involuntary

Civil
subpoena

Government identification

Road map (zoomed in)

Today

Retrospective

Prospective

Private Government

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Private Government

Voluntary

n/a

n/a

Compelled

Voluntary disclosure to the feds?

- 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) says otherwise:
 - “[A] provider of remote computing service or electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service . . . to any governmental entity

Turning over subscriber data

Private

Government

Voluntary

OK



Involuntary

Civil
subpoena

McVeigh v. Cohen

- boysrch@aol.com sends an email to a Navy volunteer about a toy drive
- The Navy launches an investigation
- Through some social engineering, they learn that “boysrch” is Senior Chief Petty Officer Timothy R. McVeigh
 - (What rank comes above Senior Chief?)
- They discharge him for being gay

McVeigh v. Cohen

- Did AOL violate the ECPA?
 - Probably not; they didn't "knowingly" reveal his information to the Navy
- So if the ECPA tells intermediaries what not to do, why is the *government* in violation of it?
 - Otherwise, the statute has no bite at all
 - Hard question: what are the remedies?

Mandatory disclosure done right

- § 2702 has exceptions allowing some voluntary disclosures
 - Why didn't *McVeigh* involve “consent?”
- § 2703 lets the government get a search warrant (on probable cause) or court order (on “reasonable grounds” of relevance)
- Court orders require notice to the subscriber (not necessarily up front); search warrants don't

Turning over subscriber data

Private

Government

Voluntary

OK




Involuntary

Civil
subpoena

18 U.S.C. §§
2702 & 2703

Prospective identification

Road map (zoomed in)



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On the governmental side

- 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121 *et seq.*
 - Pen registers (outgoing) and trap and trace devices (incoming) are phone-era technology, but ECPA uses analogous definitions for Internet-era ones
 - An *ex parte* court order will issue on a certification of relevance
 - NB: this is *only* non-content information

On the private side: *Bunnell*

- TorrentSpy offers the equivalent of hyperlinks to illegal copies of movies
- The MPAA will soon sue TorrentSpy out of existence
- In the meantime, the MPAA would dearly love to know who's been downloading, and sic its thugs on them
- There's just one little problem . . .

Server logs

- If TorrentSpy had a list of the IP addresses of its users, it would be discoverable (Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and 34)
 - But TorrentSpy doesn't have such a list
 - How is that possible?
- TorrentSpy keeps the addresses only long enough to respond to requests
 - It never writes the addresses to a log file

Is data in memory discoverable?

- Or, put another way, is there a duty under the Federal Rules to *preserve* data in memory—data that would ordinarily be thrown out within seconds or minutes?
- Interesting analogy to “fixed” for purposes of copyright (*MAI v. Peak*)
- There’s one terrible fact for TorrentSpy:
 - They affirmatively disabled logging

Bigger issues

- TorrentSpy is a bad actor: they disabled logging, and just look at the name!
- But hard facts make bad law (sometimes)
 - Does this case obliterate the distinction between preservation and creation?
 - Does it impose design obligations on web sites and ISPs?
 - How about privacy policies?

Prospective monitoring

Private Government

Voluntary

n / a


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Involuntary

Bunnell

18 U.S.C. §§
3121 *et seq.*

Road map (zoomed in)



Next time

Big Brother is watching you