The previous post mentions the Skylink garage door opener DMCA case. The EFF mentioned this case in its breaking news page, and Slashdot is on the ball as well. The case is The Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., No. 02-C-6376 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2003). Read on for a brief summary of the case.
Skylink Technologies and The Chamberlain Group are competitors in the electronic garage door industry. Chamberlain sells a garage door opener with "rolling code technology" that encrypts the signal from the transmitter to the receiver. Skylink distributes a universal remote control that, among other settings, has one particular setting specifically made to open Chamberlain's garage doors, even the secure "rolling code technology" doors. In order to use Skylink's universal remote control on a Chamberlain garage door, a consumer must first program the universal remote with his garage door's code.
The legal standard: "[I]t is clear that to the extent Skylink was authorized to decrypt, descramble, avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair Chamberlain's [garage door openers, or] GDOs, it cannot be held liable under the DMCA."
1. Consumers are authorized to use alternative transmitters, even for Chamberlain's secure doors.
Crucial to the court's holding is its finding that Chamberlain never demonstrated its intention to prevent consumers from using non-Chamberlain transmitters, such as Skylink's. In fact, the court finds that Chamberlain's representations strongly suggest that consumers are free to use alternative or additional transmitters; the GDO market's history of universal transmitters also belie any intention by Chamberlain to forbid unauthorized transmitters.
"In addition, a homeowner has a legitimate expectation that he or she will be able to access the garage even if the original transmitter is misplaced or malfunctions. . . . GDO transmitters are similar to television remote controls in that consumers of both products may need to replace them at some point due to damage or loss, and may program them
to work with other devices manufactured by different companies. In both cases, consumers have a reasonable expectation that they can replace the original product with a competing, universal product without violating federal law."
2. Because consumers do not lack authority to use alternative transmitters, and because consumers must program Skylink's remote in order to circumvent Chamberlain's "rolling code technology," the court holds that there has been no violation of the DMCA.
Thoughts
Although it's not entirely clear, it seems that Chamberlain could invoke the protection of the DMCA by simply making it clear that it forbids its customers from using unauthorized transmitters to open Chamberlain doors. Therefore it's not strictly true, as the Slashdot story suggests, that the "DMCA doesn't protect garage door remotes." However, as the court notes, Chamberlain is unlikely to do so: such a bar would make Chamberlain's garage doors comparatively less attractive in a market where universal transmitters are ubiquitous.
The reason people seem to think that GDOs are now free from the constraints of the DMCA is the court's curious paragraph on "a homeowner['s] . . . legitimate expectation," which is quoted above. At least from a cursory reading of the case, I don't think that this is the dispositive paragraph. What the court seems to be saying here is that the existing market for GDOs, including the proliferation of universal transmitters, creates a presumption that consumers are authorized to use alternative unauthorized transmitters. Chamberlain fails to rebut this presumption because it fails to show that it affirmatively forbade consumers from using unauthorized transmitters. This interpretation suggests two consequences: (1) Chamberlain could rebut this presumption, and therefore place its GDOs under the DMCA; (2) in other markets, or for other products, this presumption of authorization may not be available, and it may therefore be that much easier for a company to demonstrate a violation of the DMCA sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.